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law and criticized HEW's reasoning. 60 The facts differ since California
uses a statutory maximum standard of payment, while Texas uses a ratable reduction standard of payment. 61 Furthermore, the California suit
was based upon § 602(a)(7)62 of the Social Security Act, while the Texas
suit was based upon § 602(a)(23) 63 and the fourteenth amendment. The
court in Villa disagreed with HEW's contention that the example given
by the Supreme Court in a footnote in Rosado, which subtracted additional income from the standard of need rather than the level of benefit,6 4 was mere dictum. It characterized the example as "necessary to the
[Supreme] [C]ourt's interpretation of the 1967 amendment which
requires standards of need and statutory maximums to be increased ..."65
While HEW approval of a -plan which subtracts income from the
standard of need rather than the level of benefit is significant, it is not
necessarily binding. The courts have not hesitated to overrule that
agency when it deems a ruling contrary to a statute or congressional
policy.
The instant case held that there was a conflict in the Social Security
Act and the budgeting procedure of subtracting an AFDC family's
income from its statutory maximum grant rather than its standard of
need when computing the amount of the grant. The court's interpretation was based in part on its interpretation of legislative intent and
in part on permissive statements in HEW's rules and regulations.
Janice C. McCoy
CRIMINAL

LAW-KIDNAPPING-ASPORTATION

OR CARRYING AWAY Is

A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE OF KIDNAPPING. People v.
Adams, 192 N.W.2d 19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
On October 18, 1965, several inmates of Jackson State Prison, including Adams, were engaged in a conversation concerning their grievances
against the administration. A mixture of alcohol and barbiturates had
60

Villa v. Hall, 490 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Cal. 1971).

01 Under the Texas plan, the Department of Public Welfare determines a family's

standard of need according to its statewide guidelines. An adult is allowed $65 per month
for food, clothing and other essentials; each child under 18 is allowed $25 per month;
the maximum rent allowed is $50; and utilities are budgeted at $13. The standard of need
for a family of four children would be $228. The state provides a level of benefit of
75% of need (as of March, 1972). The maximum grant for a family of four would be $171.
(The same percentage level is applied to all AFDC families no matter what their size.)
62 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1971).
63 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1971). This section requires states to
adjust their standards of need to reflect changes in the cost of living.
64 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 409 n.13, 90 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 n.13, 25 L. Ed.2d 442,
454 n.13 (1970).
65 Villa v. Hall, 490 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1971).
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been consumed and the mood of the prisoners became rebellious. A
disturbance arose in one of the cellblocks during the lunch hour while
all the prisoners were out of their cells. When a prison official appeared
on the scene to help restore order, he was seized at knife point. Since
the danger of a full scale riot was increasing, the official suggested that
he and the prisoners "'.. . go somewhere and talk. . .

'"'

The armed

inmates then insisted that the official accompany them fifteen hundred
feet to the prison hospital where more guards were seized. For five and
one-half hours these hostages were held in a barricaded section of the
hospital while the prisoners demanded the right to air their grievances
to the warden and an outside observer from the press. The prison by
this time was surrounded by law enforcement officers and there was
never any attempt manifested by the prisoners to escape. The official
was later released unharmed and the inmates voluntarily surrendered
their weapons. The defendant was tried and convicted of kidnapping.
Adams appealed. Held-Reversed. To constitute kidnapping the element of asportation, or carrying away, is essential. This movement of
the victim must be independent of an assault and of such an extent as
to remove him from the environment where he is found.
Under the common law, the crimes of false imprisonment and kidnapping were both considered misdemeanors. 2 In order to differentiate
between the two offenses, kidnapping required asportation of the victim
out of the country.8 This removal was the element which aggravated
simple false imprisonment. 4
In the United States prior to 1932, each state was responsible for
formulating its own kidnap statutes.' There was no federal statute,
therefore no nationwide jurisdiction over this crime.6 As a result organized kidnapping was widespread. 7 When a victim was taken across
a state line, he was outside the jurisdiction where the crime had been
committed. This made pursuit, arrest and prosecution extremely difficult.8 To combat this situation the Federal Kidnapping Act was
passed.9 In this Act, the common law element of asportation was retained and movement of a victim across a state line became essential for
conviction.10 A major difference between the statute as it stands today"
I People v. Adams, 192 N.W.2d 19, 22 (Mich. App. 1971).
24 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 218.
3 d.
4 See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 176 (2d ed. 1969).
5 It is interesting to note that at this time only six of the forty-eight states had statutes
which made kidnapping a capital offense. 75 CONG. REC. 13284 (1932).
675 CONG. REc. 13284 (1932).
7 See generally 75 CONG. REc. 13282-13304 (1932).
8Id. See also Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L. Ed. 198 (1946).
9 Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326. This Act is popularly known as the "lind.
berg Law." See 75 CONG. Rac. 5076 (1932).
10 Act of June 22, 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 326.
11 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970).
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and its earlier versions is that the original death penalty provision has
been ruled unconstitutional.' 2 In addition the law stipulates that:
[F]ailure to release the victim within twenty-four hours after he
shall have been unlawfully seized . . . shall create a rebuttable

presumption that such person has been transported in interstate or
foreign commerce. 13

The common law element of asportation has been preserved in the
United States Code as both a part of the offense and as a jurisdictional
necessity.'

4

Each state statute defining kidnapping is worded differently; therefore, it is extremely difficult to formulate a general definition of the
crime that would apply to all jurisdictions. 5 Some states have followed
the common law very closely while others have attempted to broaden
the scope of the offense by allowing almost any movement of the victim
to suffice for the element of asportation.' 6 Early American cases show
a trend toward updating the definition of the crime and away from
7
the strict common law view."
An excellent example of this trend toward a more liberal construction
and interpretation of the crime is the present California kidnap
statute.' 8 It reads in part:
Every person who forcibly steals, takes, or arrests any person in
this state, and carries him into another country, state, or county,
or into anotherpart of the same county ... is guilty of kidnapping.' 9
The breadth of this statute has produced an abundance of case law
attempting to define the limits of the asportation element. In the
1950's and 1960's, the California courts consistently held that any movement, regardless of distance, would support a conviction. 20 In People v.
Chessman, movement of the victim twenty-two feet was held sufficient
to constitute the crime. 21 In People v. Monk the court ruled that
12 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S. Ct. 1209, 20 L. Ed.2d 138 (1968).
13 18 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1970).
14 Hess v. United States, 254 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1958). However, it is not necessary that
the kidnapper know that a state line has been crossed. United States v. Powell, 24 F. Supp.
160 (E.D. Tenn. 1938).
15 1 AM. JUR. 2d Abduction and Kidnapping § 2 (1962).
16 See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 176 (2d ed. 1969).
17 See State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550 (1837). Hadden v. People, 25 N.Y. 373 (1862). In this
latter case intent alone without movement was sufficient to support conviction. Cf. State
v. Buckarow, 38 La. Ann. 316 (1886). In this civil law jurisdiction, movement within a
county or city was enough to sustain the offense.
18 CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 207 (Deering 1971).
19 Id. (emphasis added).
20 E.g., People v. Monk, 363 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1961); People v. Wein, 326 P.2d 457 (Cal.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 992, 79 S. Ct. 1122, 3 L. Ed.2d 980 (1959); People v. Chessman,
238 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1951).
21 People v. Chessman, 238 P.2d 1001, 1017 (Cal. 1951).
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forcing the victim to walk six to eight feet completed the offense of
22
kidnapping.
The danger inherent in this approach was pointed out in the New
York Court of Appeals decision of People v. Levy. 23 In this case the
armed defendants forced their way into the victims' car, took control
and drove around on city streets for a distance of twenty-seven blocks.
During the trip, jewelry and cash were taken. Subsequently the three
defendants were tried, convicted of kidnapping and sentenced to a
term of twenty years to life. On appeal the court overturned the kidnap
convictions. The court reasoned that a broad definition of the crime
includes restraint or force and movement. 24 However, these two elements are present in many other offenses as well as kidnapping.25 Although the elements are similar the penalties can be vastly different;
i.e., under some circumstances kidnapping is punishable by death.2a
Therefore, the court contended that the distinction between kidnapping
and other relatively minor crimes could be obliterated by a liberal use
of the kidnap law beyond legislative intent.27 As the court stated:
This definition could literally overrun several other crimes, notably

robbery and rape and in some circumstances assault

....

28

In 1969, the California Supreme Court, heeding the warning contained in Levy, modified the "any movement" rule in People v. Daniels. 29 In this case two defendants were convicted on several counts,

including kidnapping, rape, and robbery. In each instance, the victim
was moved from room to room in an apartment at gunpoint while the
felonies were being perpetrated. The court reversed the kidnapping
convictions and held:
The rule of construction declared in People v. Chessman . . . is

no longer to be followed. Rather, we hold that the intent of the
Legislature... [in amending the kidnap for ransom statute] ... was

to exclude from its reach not only "standstill" robberies.., but also
those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental
to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase
the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present .... 30
22

People v. Monk, 363 P.2d 865, 867 (Cal. 1961).

28 People v. Levy, 204 N.E.2d 842 (N.Y. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938, 85 S. Ct. 1770,

14 L. Ed.2d 701 (1966).
24 Id. at 843.

Id. at 844.
at 843.
27 Id. at 844.
25

26 Id.

28 Id. at 844. For an excellent historical treatment of the New York position on the
merger of other crimes with kidnapping, see Parker, Aspects of Merger in the Law of
Kidnapping, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 527 (1970).
29 People v. Daniels, 459 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1969).
Sold. at 238.
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Thus the California view is, if the movement of a victim is incidental
to the commission of another crime, it will not constitute an element

of kidnapping.3 ' In addition, the degree of asportation required is now
3 2
defined as that which increases the risk of harm to the victim.
In the instant case, the court construed the breadth of the Michigan
kidnap statute33 as requiring either carrying away or secret confinement

of the victim as an essential element to support the charge.3 4 Since
there was a flaw in the indictment against Adams, the court was never
given an opportunity to rule on the issue of secret confinement.3 5
In this case the people do not charge that the victim was secretly confined. The information charged the defendant Otis Adams with

'forcibly confining and imprisoning' his victim-the word 'secretly'

in the statutory phrase . . . was omitted when the charge was
0
drawn.3

Unless asportation was found the conviction would not stand. Thus the
court was forced not only to define the offense but also to rule on the
degree of movement required to complete the crime. Mindful of the
38
dangers outlined in Levy,8 7 the majority adopted the California view

in part and held:
[The] movement of the victim does not constitute asportation unless
it has significance independent of the assault. And, unless the victim

is removed from the environment where he is found, the consequences of the movement itself to the victim are not independently
significant from the assault-the movement does not manifest the
commission of a separate crime-and punishment for injury to
the victim must be founded on crimes other than kidnapping.3 9
There are two distinct requirements in the adopted rule: (1)The
movement must be independent of other crimes committed, and (2) the
victim must be removed from the environment where he is found.
"Environment" replaces the "substantial increase in risk" section of the
31 Id. at 238. People v. Dacy, 85 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). It will be noted that
convictions under federal law reject this rule and hold that even if movement of the victim
across a state line is incidental to the commission of another crime it will support kidnapping, See United States v. DeLaMotte, 434 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
921, 91 S. Ct. 910, 27 L. Ed.2d 825 (1971).
32 People v. Daniels, 459 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1969).
33 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 28.581 (1954). "Any person who willfully, maliciously and
without lawful authority shall forcibly or secretly confine or imprison any other person
within this state against his will, or shall forcibly carry or send such person out of this
state ... shall be guilty of a felony ...."
34 People v. Adams, 192 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
35 Id. at 21.
36 Id. at 21 (footnote omitted).
37 People v. Levy, 204 N.E.2d 842 (N.Y. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938, 85 S. Ct. 1770, 14
L. Ed.2d 701 (1966).
38 E.g., People v. Daniels, 459 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1969).
39 People v. Adams, 192 N.W.2d 19, 30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
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California rule and is defined by the majority as "the totality of the
surroundings, animate and inanimate. '' 40 The court found that movement of the prison official to the hospital did nothing to change his
situation after the assault. 4' Since the prison was an enclosed "environment," any movement was considered comparable 42to movement of
the victims from room to room in the Daniels case.
The dissent viewed the resulting decision as "absurd" and would
limit the use of the Levy-Daniels line of cases only to those situations
where the ultimate purpose of the movement is a crime other than kidnapping. 43 The minority opinion also cited two out-of-state cases with
similar fact situations in which the convictions for kidnapping within
a prison were upheld. 44 In State v. Randall, a prison warden, several
guards and civilian employees were taken hostage by knife-wielding
inmates in a Montana prison. For two days the hostages were moved
from cell to cell in order that their exact location would be unknown
to law enforcement and national guard troops outside. The Montana
court upheld the kidnapping conviction of Randall. 45 However, the
controlling factor was a definition of "secretly confined" and the ele
ment of asportation was not considered. 46 One year later the same
Montana court affirmed the kidnapping conviction of another prisoner
arising out of the same incident. 47 The court simply cited Randall as
4
controlling and again did not consider the scope of asportation. 8
Neither of these cases relate directly to the problem of movement
raised in Adams. If the indictment had been drawn to charge a "secret
confinement" then perhaps a conviction would have been upheld under
Randall. The advantage of the majority opinion is that it places the
burden of extending the penal statute on the legislature rather than
49
the courts.
40 Id. at 30.

411d. at 31.
42 Id. at 31.
43 Id.

at 34. Several other jurisdictions, in agreement with the dissent in Adams, have

shown a marked reluctance to modernize the definition of kidnapping through a use of
the Levy-Daniels cases. State v. Padilla, 474 P.2d 821 (Ariz. 1970); State v. Goham, 187
N.W.2d 305 (Neb. 1971). State v. Ginardi, 268 A.2d 534, 537 (N.J. Super. 1970), where the
court noted that the Supreme Courts of Delaware, Minnesota and Kansas (citations omitted)
have found the California/New York rule "unpersuasive."
44 State v. Frodsham, 362 P.2d 413 (Mont. 1961); State v. Randall, 353 P.2d 1054 (Mont.
1960).
45 State v. Randall, 353 P.2d 1054 (Mont. 1960). The Montana kidnap statute under
which Randall was convicted is similar to the Michigan statute in that either asportation
or secret confinement must be shown as an element of the offense. MONT. REy. CODES
§ 94-2601 (1969).
46 State v. Randall, 353 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Mont. 1960). The court stated: "To 'secretly'
confine within the meaning of our statute means confinement against the will of the
person confined which deprives him of the friendly assistance of the law to redeem himself from captivity."
47 State v. Frodsham, 362 P.2d 413 (Mont. 1961).
48 Id. at 419.
49 People v. Adams, 192 N.W.2d 19, 33 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
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The problem of defining asportation and its scope has never arisen in
Texas. This is due in part to the fact that the Texas kidnap statute
exemplifies a more conservative, common law approach to the crime. 0
Kidnapping is defined as aggravated false imprisonment and closely
resembles the Federal Kidnap Act in the asportation requirement. 5 1 The
Texas law reads:
When any person is falsely imprisoned for the purpose of being
removed from the State . . . such false imprisonment is 'kidnap52
[p]ing.'
It is not necessary under this statute that a person actually be removed
from the state since the crossing of a state line is covered by another
statutory offense.55 Texas cases, closely following the common law, show
a need for asportation both before54 and after the adoption of the kidnap statute. 55 It would seem from the wording of the law that movement manifesting an intent to leave the state is required. 56
If the same fact situation as in the Adams case had arisen in Texas,
it is doubtful that a conviction under the general kidnap statute could
be supported without some form of escape attempt. However, under
another statute, the separate, distinct crime of kidnapping for extortion
could be charged.5 7 Although many cases prosecuted under this latter
statute show asportation of varying degrees, the crime has been held to
be complete when: (1) A person is unlawfully detained or confined, and
(2) there is an intent on the part of the one confining to extort anything
of value from another.5 8 The object of the extortion need not be
money. 59

50 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.

art. 1177 (1961). Texas presently has three separate and distinct

kidnapping statutes. Article 1177 deals with simple kidnapping; article 1177(a) defines
kidnapping for extortion and article 1178 is directed at kidnapping to remove from the
state. In addition, article 1177 is further subdivided with special provisions which apply
if the victim is a minor. These three statutes do not include the crimes of false imprisonment or abduction which are covered elsewhere.
51 Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1177 (1961).
52

Id.

53 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1178 (1961).

See Click v. State, 3 Tex. 282 (1848).
E.g., Hardie v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 368, 144 S.W.2d 571 (1941).
Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1t177 (1961). See Hardie v. State, 140 Tex. Grim. 368, 372,
144 S.W.2d 571, 573 (1941). In this case the defendants seized a hostage at gunpoint and set
out toward the Louisiana state line. The hostage was released and the fugitives caught while
still in Texas. The court upheld the kidnapping convictions and stated: "We think that
there was direct testimony to show that these boys intended to take Mr. Kirby out of the
State ......
(emphasis added).
57 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1177(a) (1961). Under this law anyone "...
who forcibly
detains ... takes ... confines, or ... conceals ... for the purpose or with the intent of
taking or receiving or demanding or extorting... any money or valuable thing.., is guilty
of a capital felony .... " "The ... penalty applies in every case regardless of whether the
offense originated within or without the state .... "
5 Tyler v. State, 163 Tex. Grim. 46, 288 S.W.2d 517 (1956).
59 See Crumm v. State, 131 Tex. Grim. 631, 101 S.W.2d 270 (1937), where the signature on
a deed was held to be a valuable thing sufficient to support the crime; Oden v. State, 401
54
55
56
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